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COMMENTAIRES 
REOPENERS : THE TASK FORCE ON 
LABOUR RELATIONS, AND FREEDMAN 
David P. Ross 
INTRODUCTION 
Compensating workers displaced by technological change has been 
the subject of increasing attention. In Canada this has been attested to by 
three widely quoted Reports commissioned by the Fédéral Government 
within the space of two years *. In addition the entird body of labour légis-
lation at the fédéral level in Canada is presently under review and it is 
almost certain that some législative action will be taken with respect to 
technological displacement assistance. Strictly as a spéculative suggestion 
there may be good reason why the Fédéral Government is becoming more 
interested in adjusting workers to technological change. This spéculation 
is based on the fact that much worker displacement may unwittingly be 
fostered by public policy in the first place. This assertion is not documented 
extensively hère, but référence is made to the possibilities that collective 
public action may unwittingly lead to displacement. 
Is it not reasonable to expect that government assistance to private 
research and development will lead to technological changes that displace 
labour? Governments provide tax 
breaks for research and develop-
ment, directly underwrite private 
research and development, and 
ROSS, D. P., Assistant Professor, De-
partment of Economies, University 
of Windsor. 
* I would like to acknowledge the generous amount of time that Alton Craig, 
University of Ottawa, has given me in discussion, comment, criticism in the prépar-
ation of this study. I am also indebted to Félix Quinet and Georges Saunders of the 
Fédéral Government for much friendly discussion. Much of the research was carried 
out while the author was engaged with the Canada Department of Labour during 
the summer of 1969. However, the Department is in no way implicated with the 
results. 
1
 Canada, Report of Industrial Inquiry Commission on Canadian National Rail-
ways Run-Throughs, 1965. This is commonly referred to as The Freedman Report. 
Canada, Canadian Industrial Relations : The Report of the Task Force on Labor 
Relations, 1968. Throughout the text this will be referred to simply as the Task 
Force Report. Canada, Report of the Inquiry Commission on the St. Lawrence 
Ports, 1967. This is often referred to as the Picard Report. 
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operate institutions such as the National Research Council that work 
with private enterprise to apply basic knowledge to stimulate technolo-
gical innovation 2. 
However, probably a more important stimulant to technological 
change is produced by the whole thrust or tone of a government's économie 
policy, with its emphasis on économie growth. Below are two illustrative 
passages from a speech delivered recently by the Minister of Labour in 
Canada : 
. . . / hâve the responsibility, within Fédéral Jurisdiction, to maintain 
labour peace and to help increase the productivity of our working 
force. I mean real productivity, greater output per man per hour. 
. . . Technological change is, and must be a basic factor in the life of 
any developing industrial society. Economie growth can only occur 
when innovation makes it possible to employ a smaller proportion of 
the labour force in producing the goods and services... (emphasis 
added). 
Similar passages can frequently be found in the speeches of most other 
Cabinet Ministers as well and Government commitment to économie growth 
is too obvious to require further documentation hère. But just as surely 
as a collective commitment to growth fosters technological change, it 
indirectly fosters displacement and hence society may feel a responsibility 
for compensating those who are indirectly harmed, ostensibly by collective 
décisions aimed directly at stimulating économie growth. 
Because public policy encourages productivity advances and techno-
logical innovation, the government assures économie progress as measured 
in the size of G.N.P. ; but, what is its rôle with respect to social progress, 
perhaps more closely approximately by the distribution of G.N.P. ? If 
government is committed to stimulating the gains from technological change 
should it not then be partially responsible for the losses ? 
PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO DISPLACED WORKERS 
The Private Sector's Rôle 
Of course aiding displaced workers need not, and is not left entirely 
up to the public sector. According to a survey carried out by the author 
in 1967, 32 percent of the workers, or 28 percent of the 477 agreements 
surveyed contained an explicit référence to a technological change adjust-
ment provision3. In a study of manufacturing workers, another study 
concluded that 68 percent of the workers, or 31 percent of the 1,078 
2 For example in fiscal year 1967-68, the Fédéral Government itself spent 
$394.5 million on research and development ; and the rate of growth of this 
expenditure has been averaging around 25 percent annually. Canada, Dominion 
Bureau of Statistics, Canada Year Book, 1969 (Ottawa : Queen's Printer), p. 386. 
3
 Canada Department of Labour, Response To Technological Change, 1967. 
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agreements surveyed clearly expressed a technological change clause4. 
Finally, a smaller study of 120 collective agreements revealed that about 
17 percent of the total contracts surveyed made some explicit référence 
to technological change 5 . It should be emphasized that ail three studies 
required an explicit, or clearly expressed référence to the problem of 
technological change before a provision qualified for the survey. There-
fore, because of the existence of implicit provisions that would in fact give 
workers some assistance in the event of technological change, the above 
figures understate the true amount of protection existing in privately 
negotiated collective agreements. 
The Public Sector's Rôle 
Generally, while western govemments are willing to permit the 
private sector to work out its own distribution of income and terms of 
work occasionally it feels that the parties are not fulfilling their rôles 
adequately and consequently it intervenes in the market. In the past, 
govemments hâve intervened to impose minimum standard applying to 
such areas as hours, wages, vacations, and safety conditions. 
On the other hand, govemments need not intervene directly in the 
private sector by setting standards but rather can let the results of private 
bargaining and the income distribution that this implies stand ; but then 
it can alter this pattern, for example through the progressive tax System, 
through unemployment insurance, or through family allowance chèques. 
Finally, on other occasions govemments may change the rules of the 
private bargaining game to increase the likelihood that the parties will 
reach a désirable outcome, i.e. compulsory conciliation, extension of 
picketing, right to strike, and contract reopeners. Of course ail three 
government approaches can be, and are, applied simultaneously. 
In summary, the three board approaches are : 
1. Change relevant government statutes (for fédéral industries in Canada 
this is the Industrial Relations Disputes Investigation Act) in the 
hope that the results of a changed bargaining process may approach 
the expectations held by the public. Adoption of this approach implies 
faith in the présent private party System and indicates that only a 
little « fine tuning » is necessary to obtain acceptable displacement 
assistance. Justice Freedman has recommended postponing major 
changes until the open period of the agreement6. The Task Force 
recommends that the parties to collective bargaining be allowed, if 
they choose, to open the agreement, but only on the displacement 
assistance issue whenever technological change is imminent7. 
4
 Ontario, Department of Labour, Technological ^Change Provisions in Ontario 
Collective Agreements, 1967. 
5 Nova Scotia, Department of Labour, Technological Change Provisions in the 
Manufacturing Industry in Nova Scotia, No date. 
6
 Freedman Report, op. cit., Chap. 9. 
7 Task Force Report, op. cit., pp. 193-196. 
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2. Authorities may feel that the collective bargaining approach is suffi-
cient for those workers covered, but because it does not encompass 
the active work force it becomes désirable to intervene directly in 
the market and establish standard and minimum assistance provisions 
for ail. Along thèse lines, the Task Force has recommended a legislated 
minimum standard of six months advance notice of change8. Légis-
lation of minimum severance pay or private manpower programs 
would be other possibilities. 
3. Authorities may décide that the collective bargaining process is neither 
extensive enough, nor sufficient enough to protect even those workers 
covered by agreements. Therefore, governments may choose to 
provide assistance themselves, not by directly intervening in the 
private market and setting minimum conditions of work, but rather 
by offering compensation after the private sector has made ail its 
décisions. In thèse cases, compensation can be provided either 
through cash payments such as additional unemployment benefits or 
through services such as retraining and relocation. The Task Force 
has recommended the manpower services approach9. 
ASSISTANCE THROUGH CHANGING THE RULES OF THE GAME 
This section deals primarily with the Task Force recommendation to 
permit reopening of the collective agreement to allow only for negotiation 
and strike over technological change ; but déférence to the Freedman 
proposai of postponing change is also made. The Comments are centered 
around nine points. 
(i) There is nothing at présent to prohibit unions from including in 
agreement, programs for adjusting workers to technological displacement ; 
a union need not wait for a change to occur before it becomes concerned 
about adjusting its workers to it. For example, unions clearly look ahead 
when they are negotiating pension plans. A pension plan does not neces-
sarily or likely corne into effect the year or even the year following its 
negotiation ; but the frequency of pension plans seems to indicate that 
unions do not necessarily hâve great difficulty in obtaining worker support 
for negotiating provisions that apply only in the future. 
Can we not partially apply this analogy with respect to the needed 
foresight for displacement provisions ? Perhaps no change is planned, but 
if change does not subsequently occur, the negotiated provisions lie 
dormant in the agreement at little or no cost to either party. Furthermore, 
in the absence of explicit prior knowledge of a company's plans, I suspect 
a union by proposing and pushing for adjustment provisions would soon 
know whether a firm is planning technological changes just by the strength 
of its opposition to such proposais. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
COMMENTAIRES 217 
However, one must recognize the counter-argument often raised that 
seemingly jeopardizes the success of prior negotiation of adjustment 
provisions during the open contract period. This argument states that 
workers aren't overly concerned about something that is not imminent, 
and hence regardless of how far-sighted the union is it will be unable to 
rally much support for displacement assistance. This appears to be a 
fairly substantial argument ; but the above analogy with pension plans, 
plus the fact about 30 percent of current agreements do contain adjust-
ment provisions places the validity of this counter-argument in some doubt 
In a later section it is questioned whether adjustment to change is 
amenable to collective bargaining under any circumstances. 
However, should one accept the above counter-argument to prior 
negotiation then he quite logically concludes that workers should hâve the 
right to strike at the time the technological change is announced, since 
at this time the workers are most " up " for a strike. The real purpose of 
the reopener of course is simply to give the union an increase in bargaining 
power. In effect it is believed that without this reopener provision unions 
are unlikely to obtain displacement assistance, through the collective bar-
gaining process, that measures up to certain expected social standards ; 
but this belief is only implied and not openly admitted, and in fact may 
not even be consciously recognized. 
By attempting to influence the outcome of private bargaining it is 
being admitted by the officiais concerned that adjustment to technological 
change is an important term of work that merits spécial considération. 
Therefore, it is too important to leave entirely to the regular open col-
lective bargaining period such as happens with other issues ; consequently, 
we should change the rules for negotiating displacement assistance. How-
ever, we can legitimately raise the question that if it is such an important 
issue why not openly legislate minimum standards, so that ail members of 
the work force receive displacement assistance ? Would it not truly hâve 
been strange if minimum wage législation had applied only to those workers 
covered by collective agreements ? If it is with a concern for minimum 
social standards that we wish to change the bargaining process by applying 
technological change and/or postponement clauses, then social responsi-
bility and conscience should dictate that thèse standards be applied to 
ail ; not just those favoured with the rights of collective bargaining. On 
the other hand, if it is only intended to help those covered by collective 
agreements then the above argument cannot be employed to reject re-
opener and postponement clauses. 
(ii) A gênerai argument is presented now that is intended to at least 
call into question the justification and value of a reopener for achieving 
results even when it is considered as an approach for only assisting those 
covered by collective agreements. 
The commonly accepted of collective bargaining is that during the 
open period both parties hâve to forecast future conditions and trade-off 
issues until they are satisfied ; but once having achieved this, what we 
may call " stable equilibrium ", the agreement must be adhered to. 
218 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 26, NO 1 
To allow either party to alter one of the items of agreement at a future 
that, when its bargaining power has been allowed to increase, seems to 
permit an élément of instability and extrême uncertainty to enter into 
the bargaining process. Let me illustrate through a hypothetical situation. 
Assume that a firm and union are negotiating during the regular 
open period and that the union does not propose displacement assistance 
but demands a wage of $ (x) per hour. On this basis let us assume 
that the firm concèdes the $ (x) per hour after reviewing its économie 
position, including any possible technological changes, and the probability 
and success of a union strike. 
Now let us assume a slightly différent negotiation path between 
thèse same two parties. The union opens negotiations requesting $ (x) 
per hour plus a displacement assistance provision. The firm on the basis 
of the same calculation as before, décides it cannot offer both ; it counters 
with $ (x — y) per hour and an assistance provision. In this case the 
firm has calculated the likely cost of the assistance provision $ (y) based 
on the likelihood of a technological change, and then offered a residual 
wage rate. 
Obviously, the wage in the second example will be lower than in 
the first if (y) does involve any expected real cost. If we introduce many 
more items into the bargaining package the trading-off process becomes 
more complex, but the underlying principle remains the same, and in either 
example what finally émerges is a " stable equilibrium " agreed to by 
both parties. Under collective bargaining and the right to strike both parties 
hâve been pushed to their limits. 
But now let us change the initial rules of the bargaining game. What 
would happen in the circumstances of the first example if the union 
could at some later date open negotiations on displacement assistance 
only. In effect, the company may be trapped. If it is now forced into 
granting an assistance provision equal to $ (y) then shouldn't it also 
be able to adjust the wage package and/or other benefits down to the total 
$ (x — y) per hour level also, as in the case of the second example ? 
If not, the firm may be placed in an awkward position : it has offered 
wages and benefits with the understanding that there is no assistance 
provision ; but now such a provision is introduced which if granted may 
act a hardship of the firm. Whether it does or not dépends on how weÛ 
management calculated the future costs and benefits of technological 
change during negotiations in the open period. 
Of course under the reopening provision the firm need not grant 
any displacement assistance since the union only has the right to strike 
and it may not be successful in achieving its demands. Assuming the 
firm was offering as much as it could initially when it granted $ (x) 
per hour, the firm will now resist any assistance provision ; but, is this 
an acceptable resuit as far as adjusting to technological change goes, i.e., 
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is the higher wage and benefit level previously negotiated for those 
remaining in the firm of any value to the displaced workers ? Obviously 
not, and hence the value (effectiveness) of reopeners may be questioned 
in gênerai. 
The fallacy of reopening for one item is found in a basic principle 
of collective bargaining ; this is that the union and company not only 
hâve to calculate the given total sum that they are limited to gaining and 
giving respectively, but they must also break down this total among 
the many issues presented at the bargaining table. It is apparent that this 
trading-off of issues has to be done simultaneously. If bargaining is not 
done simultaneously on ail issues then while both sides know the acceptable 
total sum, they will be at a loss to know what proportion of the total to 
allot to any one issue. For example, how can management settle on the 
hourly wage issue in January when it does not know what the union will 
demand in severance pay in December ? Consequently, this type of 
behaviour could lead to management holding back on other issues in 
order to provide itself with a " buffer zone " against the increased uncer-
tainty. As a resuit, management may be willing to concède less on the 
other issues in bargaining, thus rendering bargaining less useful to the 
workers even for traditional issues. 
One can appreciate how this uncertainty will be increased, and the 
reluctance to concède on ail issues even greater, when the possibility 
exists that unions can block change altogether. Under thèse circumstances, 
and as the pace of technological change increases, the company because 
it lacks control over its future production plans will find it increasingly 
difficult to enter into binding agreements at any time. 
Of course mature and co-operating parties will adapt to the changed 
bargaining process by agreeing during regular negotiations on the total 
amount to be set aside for displacement assistance when it occurs. In 
mature bargaining relationship managements will be frank enough to admit 
any changes they plan during the proposed contract period. The right to 
strike under the reopener provision then acts only as a guarantee that a 
management will in fact provide the sum it has agreed to ; although perhaps 
there may be some disagreement as to the methods of distributing the sum. 
In fact one of the major advantages of the reopener clause may corne 
about indirectly since the uncertainty it créâtes may force a more honest 
and co-operative approach to the problem, so that increasingly the 
parties will agrée to substantive assistance provisions being explicitly 
written into the agreement. 
With respect to this overall issue of negotiating the introduction 
of technological change, or adjustment assistance, I think the Task Force 
proposai criticized above is probably less sound than the Freedman 
proposai for postponing major technological changes until the open period. 
At least the Freedman proposai has the merit of providing simultaneous 
bargaining on ail issues. 
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(iii) As I understand the Task Force Report the union will hâve 
to obtain in prior negotiation the right to reopen and strike over tech-
nological change !1 0 This seems like a serious lapse in logic. If the union 
is unable to obtain substantive assistance provisions written into the 
agreement during the open period — because change is not imminent 
and the workers are not " up " for this issue — how can we expect the 
union to mobilize the workers' support to achieve the right to reopen or 
strike at a future date ? If it is difficult to mobilize support for substantive 
assistance provisions will it not be equally difficult to mobilize support 
for a reopener provision ? 
Consequently, if the right to reopen and strike over displacement 
assistance is to become useful public policy then the method employed by 
the United States would seem to be superior : give this right through 
législation but then let the parties opt out, rather than the Task Force 
proposai of opting in. 
(iv) At présent, explicit technological change provisions probably 
cover less than 50 percent of the Canadian unionized labour force. Even 
if ail agreements were to contain technological change provisions of some 
kind, only about one-third of the non-agricultural work force would be 
covered11. This is not an indictment of collective bargaining but rather 
the reality of the extent of unionization in Canada. If it is desired to 
extend protection to the other two-thirds of the labour force by changing 
the rules of collective bargaining, unionization has to be increased first. 
(v) There is no guarantee that reopeners, and negotiated provisions 
will provide any minimum protection nor is there any guarantee that ail 
workers in the bargaining unit will be protected. Technological change 
adjustment provisions often exclude workers, usually on the basis of 
lack of seniority ; but is this to say that low seniority workers are not 
harmed by technological change ? Therefore, there is no guarantee that 
provisions will be effective, i.e. that adjustment assistance will be some-
what commensurate with the worker's actual losses. 
(vi) There is no guarantee that the negotiated technological change 
provisions will strive to be efficient. Often retraining may be the most 
efficient adjustment procédure available for many of the workers, but the 
union may prefer feather-bedding while the company may prefer severance 
pay. Therefore, the cost to the economy of displacement assistance may 
be much greater than it would be if the Government regulated displacement 
assistance. 
(vii) It is quite conceivable that displacement assistance is not 
an issue well suited to the process of collective bargaining. The reason 
io ibid. 
11
 Union membership in Canada is taken from : Canada, Labour Organizations 
In Canada, 1968, p. vii. 
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this may be is that adjustment provisions unlike other provisions such 
as wages, vacations, welfare plans, hours of work, are not likely or often 
to be applied to ail of a firm's work force since they apply only to those 
displaced. The majority of workers not fearing personal displacement may 
be loathe to trade off hourly wages or other benefits for assistance to a 
fringe of displaced workers who they will likely never see again. 
Consequently, even if bargaining for adjustment assistance occurs si-
multaneously with the change itself as a resuit of a reopener provision, 
unless it affects the majority of the workers, or a large vocal minority 
there is not likely to be strong support for displacement assistance within 
the union. 
(viii) The Task Force refers to expérience in the United States 
with regard to contract reopeners. In that country there is nothing in 
the law to preclude the parties form adopting strike and lock-out 
procédures to settle any issue. But, in fact "well over 90 percent of 
collective agreements in that country contained negotiated no-strike, no 
lock-out and grievance arbitration clauses "1 2 . 
My observation on this is, therefore, why bother giving the right 
in law if in fact it is seldom going to be practised? Can't we perhaps 
infer from this expérience in the United States that this particular change 
in the rules of the game is not that sought after and consequently may 
not be of much use in providing displacement assistance ? 
(ix) Finally, it should be observed that as the resuit of technological 
change not ail firms receive excess profit which automatically becomes 
a fund available for assistance payments. Because of the compétitive 
market process much of any cost saving due to technological change 
may be passed on to the consumer in lower real priées ; unfortunately, 
in the présent inflationary period this will not likely be observed as a 
réduction in the prevailing money price for the product but rather in a 
slower rate of increase, or stability, in the money price. But compared 
to other priées the real (relative) price of this good may drop. This is 
not to say that ail change leads to lower priées ; in some industries there 
is little compétitive pressure in factor and product markets and priées 
may be " administered " rather than determined by compétitive forces. 
The purpose of this comment, however, is only to point out the 
possibility that many innovating firms may be fighting for their lives 
and undertaking technological change only because their competitors hâve 
forced them to. Consequently, one should not always assume that firms 
hâve vast profits out of which they can provide displacement assistance. 
In most instances it is the consumer and the remaining employed factors 
who are reaping the benefits from change, and consequently it is they, 
if anyone, who should pay for assistance through higher priées and/or 
taxation and subséquent government expenditures. Moreover, if one 
12 Task Force Report, op. cit., p. 195. 
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considers adverse shifts in final demand as a form of technological change 
then the firms experiencing this shift hâve no profits whatsoever for 
providing assistance, i.e. as in coal mining. 
CONCLUSION 
If nothing else, thèse comments on an altered collective bargaining 
process should raise serious questions as to what results the right to re-
open and strike will hâve. It certainly is not évident that a change in the 
bargaining process is going to yield a pronounced increase in worker 
protection. But even granted that it does it is not clear eut that thèse 
gains will exceed the costs arising from the instability and uncertainty 
created. In effect we may be seriously impairing the collective bargaining 
process, which works well for other issues, in order to make questionable 
and marginal gains in the area of adjustment to change, an issue perhaps 
not suited to the collective bargaining process. If adjustment to tech-
nological change is truly a serious social issue it should not be attacked 
indirectly through some process that yields uncertain benefits and almost 
certainly some costs. Surely, David killed Goliath with a small slingshot 
but one cannot be confident that this outeome would always occur. 
Some Comments on the Task Force on 
Labour Relations, Freedman, and Reopeners : 
A Reply to David P. Ross 
H. D. WOODS 
David P. Ross in his article published in this issue, is critical of the 
Report of the Task Force on Labour Relations with regard to its recom-
mendations for dealing with the problem of technological change. This 
answering comment is the sole responsibility of the writer and in no way 
is it to be taken to express the views of other members of the Task Force. 
With much of what Ross says there can be no serious quarrel and indeed 
a large part of this article is not inconsistent with the Task Force Report. 
However, he seems to hâve misread or misunderstood the intention of 
the recommendations in the report dealing with industrial conversion, the 
term used in the report to encompass technological change. 
Ross is at great pains to find some justification for public assumption 
of some responsibility for resolving the impact of technological displace-
ment. He states : « If government is committed to stimulating the gains 
from technological change, should it not then be partially responsible for 
the losses ? » 
